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Abstract 
 
As Islamic banking comes of age 40 years after its beginning, scholars and academics are 
calling for a better version 2. Regulators in Malaysia and Pakistan are pushing the industry to 
adopt more Islamic contracts which live up to the spirits of Shariah. Malaysia, specifically, 
has launched the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA) as a step in this direction. To 
facilitate the transition, this study has two objectives; to test whether conventional rates is 
still cointegrated with Islamic banks’ profit rates in Malaysia and a ranking of the exogeneity 
of the factors that affect the profit rates. It uses a range of multivariate time series techniques 
namely the cointegration test, vector error correction model (VECM), cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests, variance decomposition 
(VDC), impulse response and persistence profiles. This study contributes to the literature 
through its use of the latest data (up to December 2014) and its rank of less-tested variables 
such as the ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets. The VDC ranking can also serve 
as a basis for comparison for the effects of IFSA. This research finds that Islamic profit rates 
are still cointegrated withconventional rates such as the overnight policy rate (OPR) and fixed 
deposit rates. Additionally, it is also led by Islamic banks’ dependency on deposits for 
funding and their market shares. These findings may give urgency to policy makers and 
practitioners to evolutionise current Islamic banking practices towards what is likely to be a 
more stable financial system.  
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 Islamic banking: 40 years later, still interest-based? Evidence from Malaysia 
 
1. Introduction: the issue motivating the study 
 
The issue with Islamic banking currently is that most of its products are replicas of 
conventional finance. The profit rates of its investment accounts are thus, similar to 
conventional deposits. This has been cited by authors such as Wilson (2012) as the reason 
why there is little need for a different set of regulations for Islamic finance. But true Islamic 
finance is different from conventional. In fact, their foundations are antithetical to each other. 
While conventional finance is interest-based, Islamic finance focuses on an equitable 
distribution of profits and losses. 
The reasons cited in the theoretical discourse for the similarity between Islamic and 
conventional rates include a lack of compatibility between the current legal and financial 
systems with Islamic finance. The latter has had to evolve towards becoming more 
conventional-like to compete in a system dominated by the former. Some practitioners also 
cite customers’ risk aversion as to why their hands are tied from disbursing true profit and 
loss rates. Customers, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, want deposit guarantees and fixed 
payments since this is the system that they are accustomed to. Islamic finance on the other 
hand, requires a system thataccommodates the sharing of profits and losses.  
 
Bankers also seem averse to implementing profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts and thus, 
disbursing the true rates because of moral hazard problems. They say that they do not have 
the expertise to monitor and take on the risks of joint venture types of partnerships. To 
implement contracts such as musharakah and mudarabah, banks will first need to overcome 
the issue of asymmetric information since customers know first-hand the profit and loss 
outcomes of their projects. Otherwise, asymmetric information can lead to adverse selections 
by banks in that they may select non-profitable projects for funding as a result of 
misreporting by customers.  
 
Yet another reason is the lack of hedging and liquidity tools for Islamic banks, an issue which 
remains a major problem for Islamic banks in all markets that they operate in. These reasons 
hamper the Islamic banks’ ability to compete effectively with conventional banks on their 
own terms. Indeed reforming Islamic finance practices can be like trying to squeeze a round 
peg into a square hole. Academics, scholars and practitioners thus cite these reasons as to 
why the rates between Islamic investment accounts follow closely their conventional 
counterparts, although in theory they should be worlds apart. 
 
Their rates should be different because they have diametrically opposite starting points. 
Instead of a benchmark which is based on the price of money, Islamic finance’s key index 
should be based on the value and volume of real economy transactions. Some of this may be 
done through fixed rate contracts such as murabaha, ijarah and wakalah but Islamic banks 
also need to be supporters and users of PLS contracts such as musharakah and mudarabah as 
and when they serve the objective better. These contracts are more appropriate for 
investments and business ventures. Since Islamic banks invest depositors’ monies, as do the 
norm in banking, they should theoretically disburse profit and loss rates based on the 
outcomes of the investments, not conventional fixed deposit rates. 
 
That Islamic investment account rates is similar with interest rates and conventional fixed 
deposits have been confirmed in several empirical studies. In fact, Chong and Liu (2009) 
found, based on data between 1995 and 2004, that contrary to expectations, Islamic 
investment rates was significantly lower and less volatile than conventional deposit rates. 
Farook, Hassan and Clinch (2012) also found that most Islamic banks manage their profit 
distributions towards market-based interest rates and away from asset returns. The extent is 
directly relatedto customers’ religiosity, the market’s financial development, the banks’ asset 
composition, and the existence of discretionary reserves. Further, Cevik and Charap (2011) 
from the International Monetary Fundfound long-run cointegration and statistically 
significant correlation between the PLS returns of investment accounts in Malaysia and 
Turkey and their conventional bank deposit rates. 
 
To differentiate Islamic banking from conventional, Malaysia, whose central bank is the only 
in the world which is shaping the growth ofits Islamic finance industry, has taken some bold 
steps. As part of IFSA,its central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), requires Islamic 
banks to reclassify their deposits into principal-guaranteed wadiah or qard accounts, with no 
returns paid, or non-guaranteed, restricted and unrestricted investment accounts based on 
wakalah, mudarabah or musharakah. The objective is to steer the industry back to its roots 
by enforcing the practice of more genuine PLS contracts. Its success will have global 
implications for other regulators which are either looking to take advantage of the fast growth 
in Islamic finance or those, which like BNM, are trying to steer the industry towards a better 
version 2.These include the regulators of Pakistan, Turkey and Russia, among others. 
 
To facilitate the transition, this study uses the latest data (up to December 2014) from Islamic 
banks in Malaysia to test whether conventionalratesare still cointegrated with profit rates. 
Results of the cointegration technique will have policy implications as some of IFSA’s 
regulations kick off on 16 June 2015.If current mudarabah investment accounts are found to 
be no different from conventional saving deposits, lessons need to be drawn to ensure Islamic 
banks do not do more of the same with IFSA. Additionally, this study leverages ona useful 
feature of VDC to rank the exogeneity of the factors that affect Islamic banks’ profit 
rates.Further, the ranking is of less tested variables such as the ratio of Islamic deposits to 
total Islamic assets (as proxy for banks’ dependence on depositor funding) and the ratio of 
Islamic deposits to total deposits (as proxy for the impact of market share on the 
determination of investment account rates). 
 
Theoretically, the more dependent the banks are on deposits for funding, the more likely are 
they to match conventional rates so as to keep the depositors’ monies with them. Islamic 
banks extract a significant management fee from the gross profit distributions to depositors. 
As such, they are reliant on depositors for earnings albeit to different extents. Those which 
depend more on depositor funding than shareholder funds are more likely to provide 
competitive rates, which are in line with conventional rates. This is to attract the deposit 
monies of the conventional loyalists (those who put their monies in interest-bearing accounts) 
and the floaters (the indifferent ones). On the other hand, those with relatively larger 
shareholder funds compared to the depositor bases may be less pressured to align their rates 
with conventional as the risk of collapsing as a result of large-scale depositor withdrawal 
(bank runs) is not as high. They may provide returns that are more consistent with their 
business or asset returns (Farook, Hassan and Clinch, 2012).  
 
In terms of market share, in theory, the higher is it for Islamic banks, the less likely is the 
need for them to offer the same rates as conventional banks. This is also related to the extent 
of Islamic finance penetration in the country. Most Islamic banks currently operate in a dual 
system where they compete with conventional banks for deposits. Islamic banks have an 
advantage in attracting the Shariah loyalist segment of the market but other customers, 
namely the conventional loyalistsand the floaters,are sensitive to price and features of the 
products. To attract their deposit monies, Islamic banks may be pressured to match 
conventional rates. The extent to which Islamic banks may yield to this pressure depends on 
the size of their market shares. A larger share reduces the need to match rates.Farook, Hassan 
and Clinch, 2012, however uses a different proxy for market share than this study. They used 
the Herfindahl concentration index which is the sum of the squares of the market shares of 
each individual bank. This study on the other hand, measures the market share of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia compared to the entire banking system through the ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total deposits. 
 
The results of this study are thus potentially helpful in highlighting tocentral bankers and 
chiefs of Islamic banks thefactors which influencecurrent investment account rates and 
therefore, the need to steer the business towards a truer implementation of Islamic finance 
principles.  
 
This study uses the multivariate time series technique. Although it has its limitations, time 
series isan improvement over traditional regression because it tests the long-run theoretical 
relationships between the variables,instead of assuming that a theory holds.This is done 
through the cointegration test and vector error correction model (VECM) which also decides 
the direction of causality ie which variables are exogenous (leaders) and which are 
endogenous (laggers). Traditional regression on the other hand, assumes causality based on 
theories. Secondly,VDCproduces a useful ranking of the leadersand laggers among the 
variables. It tells us their relative exogeneity and endogeneity. This list may be useful for 
BNM as a basis for comparison to gauge whether profit ratespost-IFSA conforms to that in a 
true Islamic finance system or not. 
 
The results show strong evidence of cointegration between the Islamic and conventional 
variables over the long term. The VECM results also show that Islamic variablessuch as 
investment account and interbank rates and the ratio of Islamic deposit to total deposits are 
endogenous. They respond to the exogenous variables, which tend to be non-Islamic, such as 
the OPR and conventional fixed deposit rates. This means that the non-Islamic variables are 
leading the Islamic variables. This is in line with previous studies, which found that Islamic 
banking isled by conventional interest rates since it is still a minority player in a dual banking 
system. The VDC results, which indicate future trends, are broadly in line with the VECM 
results, which are based on the sample. It shows that the conventional rates are strong leaders 
while the Islamic rates are followers.  
 
Additionally, the leaders include the ratios which are more exogenous than the conventional 
rates. This is possibly because there are more external factors affecting the ratios for banks’ 
dependence on depositor funding and market share than the factors that affect conventional 
rates. The latter is primarily driven by a country’s monetary policy and thus, the interbank 
rates. The ratios however are affected by more external factors such as the banks’ reliance on 
shareholder funding, their business models, regulations involving liquidity, capital adequacy 
and deposits and the government’s ‘enthusiasm’ for Islamic finance. These are possibly why 
the ratios are found to be more exogenous than the conventional rates. The finding that the 
Islamic rates are the weakest followers is in line with the VECM results which stated that the 
Islamic investment account rates and the Islamic interbank rate are endogenous. 
 
Section II reviews the empirical studies which investigated the determinants of Islamic 
investment account rates. This leads tothe major objective of the study in Section III. It 
isfollowed by the theoretical underpinnings and themethodology used in Sections IV and 
V,respectively. The contributions of this paper are detailed in Section VI.Data, empirical 
results and discussionsare dealt within Section VII. Finally, this article endswith the major 
conclusions and policy implicationsof the study in Section VIII. 
 
2. Literature review  
 
Studies such as Chong and Liu (2009), Farook, Hassan and Clinch (2012) and Cevik and 
Charap (2011) have found that Islamic deposit and investment account rates are closely tied 
to conventional deposit rates. Chong and Liu (2009) used monthly data on Islamic investment 
rates and conventional deposit rates from BNM’s Monthly Statistical Bulletin between April 
1995 and April 2004. Their sample size was 109. They ran two stationarity tests; ADF and 
Philips-Peron, a Granger-causality test and a Johansen cointegration test. They found that 
contrary to expectations, Islamic investment rates were significantly lower and less volatile 
than conventional deposit rates. Additionally, they found that none of the Islamic investment 
rates is cointegrated with the return on the KLCI equity index.  
 
Farook, Hassan and Clinch (2012) did a related study which found that most Islamic banks 
manage their profit distributions towards market-based interest rates and away from asset 
returns. The extent is directly relatedto customers’ religiosity, the market’s financial 
development, the banks’ asset composition, and the existence of discretionary reserves. On 
the other hand, the proportion is inversely related to the market’s familiarity with Islamic 
banking, market concentration, reliance on depositor funding and how long the Islamic bank 
has been in operation. Data from 50 Islamic banks between 1993 and 2005 were used. To 
determine the factors that affect banks’ profit management distribution, they used the 
multiple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. To establish the phenomenon of banks 
managing their profit distributions, a descriptive analysis involving four variables; asset 
spread, deposit spread, equity spread and a combined spread (asset spread and the inverse of 
the deposit spread) was done. 
 
Cevik and Charap (2011) from the International Monetary Fund examined the behaviour of 
conventional bank deposit rates and the rates of return on retail Islamic PLS investment 
accounts in Malaysia and Turkey. They used monthly data from January 1997 to August 
2010. Four econometric tools were used; cointegration and causality tests, VECM and a study 
of the correlation of the volatility between the two types of retail products. They found long-
run cointegration between the PLS returns and the conventional bank deposit rates. And their 
volatility is found to be statistically significant and correlated. The multivariate causality tests 
also showed that conventional bank deposit rates Granger cause returns on PLS accounts. 
They concluded by saying that these have policy implications for price and financial stability. 
 
Other descriptive studies echo these findings. Feisal Khan (2010) said that based on his 
investigation, three decades after the introduction of Islamic banking and finance (IBF), much 
of it remains functionally indistinguishable from conventionalbanking. However, despite not 
providing an alternative to conventionalbanking and finance, IBF does strengthen a distinctly 
Islamic identity by providingIslamic terminologies for de facto conventional financial 
transactions. 
 
Azmat, Skully and Brown (2015) developed a theoretical model to explain why Islamic 
banks’ profit rates have been similar with conventional deposit rates. Besides the current 
literature which says that Islamic banks refrain from PLS contracts because of asymmetric 
information problems, they argue that risk-averse depositors also hinder Islamic banks’ 
ability to offer true PLS contracts for their assets. The authors concluded by saying that PLS 
and Islamic joint venture contracts are perhaps more suited for venture capitalists and private 
equity companies. 
 
This topic has added urgency given that some of IFSA’s regulationsare set to kick off in June 
2015. Since its objectives include customer protection, financial stability and Shariah-
compliance, the results of this study, which serve to confirm whether conventional interest 
rates is still cointegrated with Islamic banks’ profit rates and the exogeneous factors that 
affect the rates currently, can serve as a guide for the transition. Indeed the International 
Monetary Fund said in an April 2015 paper that “an important regulatory challenge is to 
ensure that profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA) at Islamic banks are treated in a 
manner that is consistent with financial stability. Manyregulators treat these as deposits, 
which undermines their loss and liquidity absorbency feature.When regulators do allow for 
some loss-absorbency, they do not always pay sufficient attention tothe implications for 
corporates governance and consumer protection. Regulation and supervisionshould ensure 
that PSIAs are not treated as pure deposits, while also ensuring better disclosure 
andenforcement of the investors’ rights, including those related to payouts and reserves.” 
 
3. The objectives of the study 
 
This study has two objectives. In light of IFSA, the cointegration technique is used to test 
whether conventional interest rates are still cointegrated with Islamic banks’ profit rates in 
Malaysia. Secondly, VDC is used to rank the exogeneity of the factors that affect the profit 
rates. Although there are similar studies in the past, this research uses the latest monthly data 
from 2007 to 2014 from BNM’s monthly statistical bulletin. Besides commonly tested 
variables such as the 6-month Islamic investment account rates and conventional fixed 
deposit rates, this study includes other less tested variables such as the ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total Islamic assets, ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits, overnight policy 
rates (OPR) and Islamic interbank rates. 
 
4. Theoretical underpinnings 
 
Given that the principles behind Islamic finance are diametrically opposite to the foundations 
of conventional finance, the rates on their products should be different. While Islamic finance 
emphasises the sharing of risks through an equitable distribution of profits and losses, 
conventional finance has, as its foundations, interest and therefore, the time value of money. 
It refers to the concept that money is preferrednow to later because of its ability to earn more 
money over time. The current reality however is that Islamic profit rates tend to be aligned, if 
not determined, by conventional rates. This seems to be the result of operating in a dual 
banking system and in some countries as minority players. Even countries with sizeable 
Islamic markets such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have rates that are aligned with the local 
LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rates). Again, this seems to be the consequence of being 
minority players in the global financial system. Islamic assets are less than two percent of 
global assets.  
 
Among the reasons cited for the ‘similarity’ of Islamic banking and conventional products is 
the lack of compatibility between the current legal and financial systems with Islamic 
finance. For the latter to stay competitive, it has had to evolve to fit into the conventional 
system. Thus, the ‘similarity’ has been cited as the result of operating in a dual banking 
system and in some countries as minority players.    
 
Other reasons include customers’ risk aversion themselves. Having been accustomed to the 
guarantees and fixity of payments in the conventional system, practitioners cite customers’ 
lack of appetite for a true distribution of profits, if these come with the possibility of losses. 
Yet another difficulty in implementing PLS contracts in the current system is the issue of 
moral hazard. To implement contracts such as musharakah and mudarabah, banks will first 
need to overcome the issue of asymmetric information since customers know first-hand the 
profit and loss outcomes of their projects. Otherwise, asymmetric information can lead to 
adverse selections by banks in that they may select non-profitable projects for funding as a 
result of misreporting by customers.  
 
Besides moral hazard issues, academics such as Iqbal, Mirakhor and Krichene (2012) have 
also highlighted the lack of hedging and liquidity tools for Islamic financial institution (IFIs) 
to compete effectively with conventional banks. In all Muslim countries, monetary and fiscal 
policies operate with interest rate-based bond issues – instruments that IFIs cannot 
legitimately use for hedging and liquidity purposes. These are among the reasons cited in the 
theoretical controversy as to why Islamic investment account rates and profit rates are similar 
to conventional rates. 
 
At the other end of the theoretical controversy, academics have argued for a significantly 
different form of Islamic finance than the version today.Bacha and Mirakhor (2013) argue 
that the essence of the true Islamic finance system is risk sharing and a proper 
acknowledgement of property rights. Theseshould then lead toan equitable distribution of 
wealth and profits or losses from business ventures.The spectrum of ideal Islamic finance 
instruments would include short-term, liquid, low-risk financing of trade contracts to long-
term financing of real sector investment. In this spectrum, there is no room to do as 
conventional finance at times does, which is to make money out of pure finance where 
instruments are developed that use real sector activity only as virtual license to accommodate 
what amount to pure financial transactions. 
 
If risk sharing is to be at the heart of Islamic finance, then Islamic banks should, in theory, be 
enthusiastic users of PLS contracts such as musharakah and mudarabah. And customers 
should be prepared to bear the risk of loss as much as they look forward to the possibility of 
earning true profit rates based on real economy activities. All of these will translate into a 
new paradigm in banking where rates for deposits and financings are very different from the 
conventional system. The current system uses interest rates, specifically the London 
Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR), to price everything from assets, opportunity costs to 
money. Whereas Islamic finance prices are based on one’s value-add to the transaction or the 
worth of a commodity. This is not to say that there can be no fixed or benchmark rates in 
Islamic finance. In fact, some contracts such as murabaha, ijarah and wakalah can be used to 
structure fixed rate returns but Islamic banks should ideally be a balanced user of the entire 
range of contracts, including PLS, to achieve the ultimate objective of an Islamic economy, 
which as stated earlier, is an equitable distribution of wealth and profits or losses from 
business ventures. 
 
Thus, industry stakeholders, mainly the regulators, have been devising ways to help Islamic 
finance move away from the clutches of conventional finance. This study serves as a humble 
attempt to add to this effort by using the latest data to confirm whether conventional rates 
such as those on deposits and interbank overnight instruments are still cointegrated with 
Islamic profit rates in Malaysia.  
 
5. Methodology   
 
This study tests the relationshipbetween Islamic and conventional rates, specifically whether 
the latterare still cointegrated with Islamic investment account profit rates. Besides the 6-
month profit rates and the conventional fixed deposit rates, it uses the ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total Islamic assets as an indicator of the banks’ reliance on deposits for funding. 
It also uses the ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits as a proxy for market share. 
Additionally, the OPR and Islamic interbank rates are studied since they are the benchmarks 
for conventional and Islamic rates respectively. 
 
The relationships between the six variables are analysed using five econometric tools namely 
a test for cointegration (Johansen); Granger-causality; VDC ranking of the leading variables 
or the most independent; a test of their inter-temporal linkages through the impulse response 
function (IRF) and lastly, an investigation of the impact of a system-wide shock on the 
variables through the persistence profiling(PP) function.   
 
The cointegration approach provides a direct test of whether the profits ratesmove together 
with the other five variables over the long-term. Regression tests may not be appropriate as 
most economic variables are non-stationaryin their level form. This violates OLS’s primary 
assumption that the variables are stationary. If the variables are non-stationary, the 
conventional statistical test such like R2, t-ratios and F-statistics will no longer be valid. As 
such, the augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test is used to confirm that the series are non-
stationary. Following which, the Johansen (1988) test is conducted to assess the long-term 
relationship between the variables.The Johansen testis used as it allows for testing 
cointegration in a system of equations in one step and also avoidspriorassumptions of the 
endogeneity and exogeneity of the variables.The Johansen test shows whether a long-run 
combination of variables is stationary and therefore cointegrated by assigning hypothetical 
coefficients that lead to a stationary error term. 
 
The direction of causality is then explored.The existence of cointegration indicates 
thepossibility of a causal link between the variables, but doesnot identify the direction of 
causality. The Granger (1969) testis used to determine which variables are exogenous and 
endogenous ie the leader and follower variables. Since the Granger test results provide little 
or no insight into the sign andmagnitude of the causality, the data is further analysed via 
VDC. 
 
The VDC, impulse response and persistence profile tests are conducted to identify the inter-
temporal linkages between the variables. The impulse response and persistence profile 
functions provide further information regarding the sign and timing of the variables’ 
adjustments to shocks. 
 
 
 
  
6. The contributions of the paper 
 
The study will advance the field in the following ways: 
 
I. It uses the latest data to test the hypothesis that Islamic investment account rates are 
cointegrated with conventional factors such as fixed saving deposits rates and OPR. 
 
II. The VDC ranking can serve as a base for comparison for BNM to gauge whether 
investment rates post-IFSA conforms to that in a true Islamic finance system or not. 
 
III. The study evaluates and ranks less tested variables such as the ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total Islamic assets (as proxy for banks’ dependence on deposits for 
funding) and the ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits (as proxy for the impact of 
market share on the determination of investment account rates). 
 
IV. Lastly, lessons from this study can be applied to other central banks which are keen to 
implement a better Islamic finance system or bring their current ones back to their 
roots. The results of this study and the success of IFSA can serve as useful guides for 
their transitions. 
 
7. Data, empirical results and discussions 
 
To test the hypothesis that Islamic profit rates are cointegrated with conventional rates, the 
following variables are used: 
 6-month Islamic investment account rates 
 6-month conventional fixed deposit rates 
 OPR 
 Islamic interbank rates 
 Ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets  
 As proxy for Islamic banks’ dependence on deposits for funding 
 Ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits  
 As proxy for the impact of market share on the determination of investment 
account rates 
This research uses the latest monthly data from BNM’s monthly statistical bulletin, which 
lists the average rates across all financial institutions in Malaysia. Theperiod covered in this 
study is between January 2007 and December 2014. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
 
ADF 
Level 
First 
differences 
 PP 
Level 
First 
differences 
With intercept and 
trend 
 
With intercept and 
trend 
Islamic 
investment 
account rates -2.69 -3.58 
 
Islamic 
investment 
account rates -1.93 -10.86 
Conventional 
fixed deposit 
rates -2.24 -4.55 
 
Conventional 
fixed deposit 
rates -1.69 -6.32 
Islamic 
interbank rates -2.15 -4.76 
 
Islamic 
interbank 
rates -1.58 -6.85 
OPR -2.15 -4.61 
 
OPR -1.6 -6.74 
Ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total 
deposits  -2.13 -7.6 
 
Ratio of 
Islamic 
deposits to 
total deposits  -1.98 -10.96 
Ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total 
Islamic assets  -2.84 -6.52 
 
Ratio of 
Islamic 
deposits to 
total Islamic 
assets  -2.36 -12.71 
95% Critical 
value -3.46 -2.89 
 
95% Critical 
value -3.42 -2.88 
 
 
The unit root tests are run because the cointegration techniques require that the variables are 
I(1), which means that they are non-stationary in their level forms and stationary in the 
differenced forms. Non-stationarity in the level forms means the variables have the long-
term, theoretical component in them. Threetypes of unit root tests were run; augmented 
Dickey-Fuller(ADF),Phillips-Peron (PP) and KPSS. ADF resolves the issue of 
autocorrelation in the variableswhile PP solves the issues of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Theseproblemsaffect the standard deviations of the coefficients. Both tests 
confirmed all six variables are I(1) at the 5% significance level.The KPSS results on the other 
hand, mostly suggested otherwise. Since both the ADF and PP tests confirm the variables’ 
I(1) status, we proceed with the cointegration test, pending the VAR (lag) order. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2: Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 
 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
6 1639 1417 1140.7 ------ ------ 
5 1606 1420 1188.6 CHSQ(36)=65.8759[.002] 38.4893[.358] 
4 1581.2 1431.2 1244.6 CHSQ(72)=115.4638[.001] 67.4620[.630] 
3 1546.3 1432.3 1290.4 CHSQ(108)=185.3849[.000] 108.3148[.473] 
2 1508.3 1430.3 1333.2 CHSQ(144)=261.4299[.000] 152.7456[.293] 
1 1474.9 1432.9 1380.7 CHSQ(180)=328.0903[.000] 191.6932[.262] 
0 1334.6 1328.6 1321.1 CHSQ(216)=608.7526[.000] 355.6757[.000] 
 
 
The table above provides the second requirement for the cointegration test. The order of the 
VAR model is found to be one, based on both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). AIC tends to indicate the higher number of lags at the 
expense of the degrees of freedom.It is also less concerned with the problem of over 
parameterization. SBC on the other hand, tends to give the lower number of lags with 
apossible problem of autocorrelation of the error correction term. In this case, there is no 
conflict as both points to an order of one. 
 
We thus proceed with the Johansen cointegration test, having determined the variables’ I(1) 
status and a lag order of one. The results show strong evidence of cointegration among the six 
variables over the long term. That they are cointegrated suggests that there is a theoretical, 
long-termrelationship among them and that each variable contains information for the 
prediction of other variables. Both the maximal eigenvalue andtrace statistics (table 3) 
suggest a cointegration vector of two at the 5% significance level. This is when the statistic is 
less than the critical value and thus, the null hypothesis of two or less cointegration vectors 
cannot be rejected. This means that there aretwo groups of three variables each which tend to 
move together over the long term. This is plausible as one of the conventional rates, for 
example, OPR may have a long-term trend with some of the Islamic variables while the other 
conventional rate, namely fixed the deposit rates, may be cointegrated with the remaining 
Islamic variables over the long-term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3: Johansen’s cointegration test 
 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR  
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When another cointegration test, Engle-Granger (E&G),was run, the results were negative 
(table 4). In this case, the Johansen test results are preferred as it does not have a restrictive 
assumption. E&G on the other hand, assumes there is only one cointegration or none. E&G 
tests for cointegration by checking whether the error term is stationary through unit root tests 
such as ADF. A stationary error term suggests the existence of cointegration as the variables 
are adjusting to each other to bring about long-term equilibrium. The Johansen test on the 
other hand, creates a stationary error term by assigning hypothetical values to the coefficients 
of the variables. It can indicate multiple cointegration patterns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Null Alternative Statistic 
95% 
Critical 
Value 
90% 
Critical 
Value 
r=0 r=1 218.347 43.61 40.76 
r<=1 r=2 42.9219 37.86 35.04 
r<=2 r=3 31.6197 31.79 29.13 
r<=3 r=4 9.0508 25.42 23.1 
r<=4 r=5 5.9438 19.22 17.18 
r<=5 r=6 4.1426 12.39 10.55 
 
Null Alternative Statistic 
95% 
Critical 
Value 
90% 
Critical 
Value 
r=0 r>=1 312.026 115.85 110.6 
r<=1 r>=2 93.6788 87.17 82.88 
r<=2 r>=3 50.7568 63 59.16 
r<=3 r>=4 19.1372 42.34 39.34 
r<=4 r>=5 10.0864 25.77 23.08 
r<=5 r=6 4.1426 12.39 10.55 
  
 
Table 4: E&G’s cointegration test 
 
  
Test 
Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -4.8725 179.108 178.1083 176.8584 177.6043 
ADF(1) -4.4555 179.197 177.1974 174.6976 176.1894 
ADF(2) -3.9066 179.201 176.201 172.4513 174.6889 
ADF(3) -3.0794 179.831 175.8307 170.831 173.8145 
ADF(4) -2.5034 180.419 175.4188 169.1693 172.8986 
ADF(5) -2.4721 180.484 174.484 166.9846 171.4598 
95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -4.8964 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood   AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the absolute value of the T-statistic (4.4555)of the ADF test for the highest AIC and SBC values is 
less than the 95% critical value (4.8964), the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the error correction 
term cannot be rejected. This indicates no cointegration among the variables. 
 
Having ascertained that the six variables are cointegrated by two vectors, a long-run 
structural modeling (LRSM) test was conducted to estimate a theoretically meaningful long-
run relationship between the variables. This was done by first imposing some restrictions on 
the relationships and then testing them.  
 
Table 5: Long-run relationship of the variables based on exact identification 
 
  Vector 1 Vector 2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows that in one of 
the vectors, Islamic investment 
account rates have statistically 
significant, long-run 
relationships with Islamic interbank rates and the ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits. 
Significant t-statistics, derived by dividing the coefficients with the standard deviations, 
implythe rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no long run relationship between the 
variables. In the second vector, the Islamic interbank rates are found to have statistically 
significant, long run relationships with the ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic 
assets,Islamic investment account rates and OPR. These suggest that Islamic rates on 
investment accounts and the interbank rates may be affected by both Islamic and 
conventional factors. 
 
This is likely as studies have found that Islamic profit rates are indeed tied closely with 
conventional rates, most probablydue to the dual banking system and Islamic banks being 
minority players.Farook, Hassan and Clinch (2012) also found that there is a negative 
relationship between the extent of Islamic banks’ market shares (as proxied in this study 
through the ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits) and their profit distribution 
management. This means that the lower are their market shares, the more likely are the banks 
to manage their investment account rates towards the interest rates. 
 
The ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets, which indicates the Islamic banks’ 
reliance on depositor funding, has also been found to affect Islamic banks’ profit distribution 
management. Contrary to the hypothesis of a positive relationship, Farook, Hassan and 
Clinch (2012) found that the relationship is significantly negative.This means that Islamic 
banks’ management of the profit rates reduces as they become more reliant on depositor 
funding. A likely reasonis that as banks’ depositor base increases, they are subject to more 
scrutiny so it is harder for managers tomanage the profit distributions without being detected. 
 
Conventional 
fixed deposit 
rates 
-0.37 -0.25 
(1.01) (0.19) 
Ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total 
Islamic assets  
0.00 -0.29* 
(NONE) (0.10) 
Islamic interbank 
rates 
5.05* 1.00 
(2.45) (NONE) 
Islamic 
investment 
account rates 
1.00 0.14* 
(NONE) (0.07) 
Ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total 
deposits  
-1.35* 0.00 
(0.67) (NONE) 
OPR 
-5.58 -0.90* 
(3.20) (0.14) 
Trend 
0.01* 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
Significant at 5% level 
Restrictions 
 
 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
  
 
Table 6: Long-run relationship of 
the variables based on over 
identification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the overidentification test, a coefficient of 0 was suggested for conventional fixed deposit 
rates because its coefficients were insignificant in both vectors in the exact identification 
stage. The results suggested thatfor Islamic investment account rates, besides the variables 
which it was found to have statistically significant, long run relationships within vector 1 of 
the exact identification stage, this time, it was also found to have a significant relationship 
with OPR. This is likely because all banking rates are ultimately benchmarked against the 
interbank rate, which in this case is OPR. The removal of the conventional fixed deposit rates 
in the test may have fast tracked the relationship between OPR and Islamic investment 
account rates. 
 
Given a p-value of 0.297, the null hypothesis, which is the restrictions in both vectors, may 
not be rejected. As per the exact identification results, this implies that Islamic rates may be 
  Vector 1 Vector 2 
Conventional 
fixed deposit 
rates 
0.00 0.00 
(NONE) (NONE) 
Ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total 
Islamic assets  
0.00 -0.25* 
(NONE) (0.10) 
Islamic 
interbank rates 
5.56* 1.00 
(2.15) (NONE) 
Islamic 
investment 
account rates 
1.00 0.05 
(NONE) (0.05) 
Ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total 
deposits  
-1.47* 0.00 
(0.51) (NONE) 
OPR 
-6.44* -1.07* 
(2.22) (0.03) 
Trend 
0.01* 0.00 
(0.003) (0.00) 
   
 
CHSQ(2)=   2.4283[.297] 
  
 
Significant at 5% level 
Restrictions 
 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
affected by both Islamic and conventional factors, particularly the OPR. We will however 
proceed with all six variables since they are found earlier to be cointegrated. 
 
Cointegration cannot tell us the directionof Granger causality ie which variable is leadingand 
which is lagging (or which variable isexogenous and which is endogenous). To discernthe 
endogeneity and exogeneity of the variables,the VECM technique is applied. VECM also 
allows an exploration of the short- and long-run dynamics among the variables since they are 
found earlier to be cointegrated. 
 
Table 7: Error correction model for the six variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the p-values of the error correction terms of both vectors of cointegration, the 
VECM results tell us that three of the variables are exogenous namely the OPR, conventional 
fixed deposit rates and the ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets. Exogeneity 
indicates that they are the leading variablesin that they absorb the exogenous shocks first 
before transmitting them to other variables. The remaining variables are found to be 
endogenous namely the Islamic investment account rates and the ratio of Islamic deposit to 
total deposits. As results for the Islamic interbank rates are mixed, we proceed with the 
significant one ie it is endogenous. Endogeneity indicates that these variables depend on the 
deviations of exogenous variableswhich tend to be non-Islamic, such as the OPR and 
conventional fixed deposit rates. It also implies that they will bear the brunt of short-run 
adjustment to bring about long-term equilibrium among the cointegrating variables. This is in 
line with previous studies done, which found that Islamic banking isled by conventional 
interest rates since it is still a minority player in a dual banking system. 
 
Additionally, the results tell us that the ratio, which is a proxy for the banks’ reliance on 
depositor funding, is exogenous while the other ratio, which is a proxy for market share, is 
Vector 2 
      
P-values 
OPR Conventional 
fixed deposit 
rates 
Ratio of 
Islamic 
deposits to 
total Islamic 
assets 
Islamic 
interbank 
rate 
Islamic 
investment 
account 
rates 
Ratio of 
Islamic 
deposits to 
total deposits 
ecm1(-1)  0.52 0.69 0.12 0.60 0.00 0.00 
ecm2(-1) 0.33 0.43 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chi-square for SC 0.96 0.87 0.22 0.03 0.53 0.53 
Chi-square for FF 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.68 0.54 0.90 
Chi-square for N 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.60 
Chi-square for 
Het 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.93 0.55 0.34 
  
Ex genous variables Endogenous variables
endogenous. This is possible because the extent of a bank’s dependence on depositor funding 
is affected by other variables such as the amount of shareholder funds it has, its business 
model and the country’s regulations on deposits. The market share proxy, on the other hand, 
is a possible endogenous variable because the deposits are mainly affected by the variables in 
this study ie the product rates and interbank rates.    
 
The diagnostics of the equations of the error correction model (testing for the presence of 
autocorrelation, functional form, normality and heteroskedasticity) generally indicatedthat the 
equations are well-specified. There are problems of normality and in two of the variables, 
functional form and heteroskedasticitybut these are not major problems for a time-series 
test.More importantly, the results show no serial autocorrelation problems, except for one of 
the variables. To check the stability of thecoefficients, the CUSUM and CUSUM 
SQUAREtests were run (figures 1 and 2). The plot of the cumulative sum of squares of the 
recursive residuals shows a structural break in mid 2010. This is plausible as Malaysia was 
experiencing the ripple effects of the global financial crisis then. Theimpact on its financial 
system, both conventional and Islamic, is a likely reason for the structural break in the 
CUSUM test. 
 
Figure 1: Islamic investment account rates as dependent variable 
Plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
 
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Islamic investment account rates as dependent variable 
 Plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals 
 
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
A dummy for the crisis period of January to December 2010 was then introduced. When the 
CUSUM and CUSUM SQUAREtests were re-run (figures 3 and 4), there were no more 
structural breaks. The OLS estimations also showed that the T-statistic for the dummy crisis, 
at 1.17 (table 8), is insignificant at the 5% level. These indicate that the coefficients are now 
stable. Although this means that the data should be separately tested ie pre- and post-2010, 
we will proceed with all of the data because otherwise the sample size is too small for 
accurate testing. 
 
Figure 3: Islamic investment account rates with crisis dummy 
Plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
 
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Islamic investment account rates with crisis dummy 
 Plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals 
 
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
Table 8: OLS estimates of the variables’ coefficients 
Islamic investment account rates as the dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After identifying 
the endogeneity and exogeneity of the variables through VECM, the orthogonalised and 
generalised VDCtechnique was applied to discern the relative degreeof endogeneity or 
exogeneity of the variables. VDC decomposes the variance of the forecast error of a 
particular variable into proportions attributable to shocks in each variable in the system 
including its own.The relative exogeneity/endogeneity of a variable can be determinedby the 
proportion of the varianceexplained by a variable’s own past. The variable that isexplained 
mostly by its own shocks (and not byothers) is deemed to be the most exogenous. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Generalised VDCresults 
 
  Horizon CFD DEPTA IINTERBR IINVR ITOTDEP OPR Ranking 
CFD 30 48.63% 2.76% 0.47% 0.30% 0.10% 47.74% 4 
DEPTA 30 0.76% 64.49% 4.56% 6.51% 23.41% 0.27% 1 
IINTERBR 30 47.97% 1.07% 0.29% 1.18% 0.17% 49.31% 6 
IINVR 30 34.32% 10.35% 2.02% 17.76% 2.87% 32.69% 5 
ITOTDEP 30 4.63% 32.45% 0.65% 2.02% 54.09% 6.15% 2 
OPR 30 47.82% 2.07% 0.28% 0.45% 0.24% 49.14% 3 
 
Where CFD = Conventional fixed deposit rates, DEPTA = Ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets, 
IINTERBR = Islamic interbank rates, IINVR = Islamic investment account rates, ITOTDEP = Ratio of Islamic 
deposits to total deposits, OPR = Overnight Policy Rates 
 
The generalised VDC technique is preferred over the orthogonalised because the latter has a 
bias towards theorder of the variables in the equation, particularly the first variable.And 
generalised VDC has a more realistic assumption of investigating the impact of a shock from 
one variable, assuming the other variables can change. Orthogonalised VDC assumes the 
other variables are kept constant. Thus, the generalised technique is more useful when the 
results are normalised as a percentage of the total. It should be noted that while the VECM 
results is based on the sample and therefore historical data, VDC results project trends into 
the future.  
Variables T-statistics 
Conventional fixed deposit rates 2.79 
Ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets 0.33 
Islamic interbank rates 2.57 
Ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits -2.68 
Overnight Policy Rates -3.03 
Dummy crisis 1.17 
 Table 10is composed of the 30th row observations out of a monthly data of 60 months.It tells 
us that the contributions of own shockstowards explaining the forecast error variance ofeach 
variable is as follows: 
 
Figure 5: Ranking of exogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These out-of- sample 
variance forecasts tell 
us that the ratios are the strongest leaders among the variables and the Islamic rates the 
weakest followers.This is possible because as mentioned, the ratios are likely to be affected 
by other variables. For example, the ratio for banks’ reliance on depositor funding may be 
affected by the amount of shareholder funds they have, the business models and the country’s 
regulations on deposits. Results for the other ratio, the proxy for market share, is however 
different from the VECM. There, it was found to be endogenous whereas through VDC, it 
came out as the second highest exogenous variable. The difference in results is probably 
because the tests cover different time frames. While VDC projects into the future, the VECM 
test is based on a historical sample. The ratio for market share (ie proportion of Islamic 
deposits to total deposits) may become exogenous in future as the factors that affect it may 
not only be the variables in this study ie the interbank and product rates.  
 
Given the implementation of IFSA, where Islamic banks can no longer use the profit 
equalisation reserve and investment risk reserve to smooth returns on investment accounts, 
the proportion of Islamic deposits to total deposits may depend on other factors. These 
include customer awareness of the Shariah merits and profit and loss potential of the 
investment accounts, willingness of other Islamic banks to participate in the investment 
account initiative and other conducive regulations enforced by BNM to spur the growth of 
Islamic finance locally. These could perhaps be the key variables affecting the ratio for 
market share in future, making it exogenous. 
 
The finding that the Islamic rates are the weakest followersis in line with the VECM results 
which stated that the Islamic investment account rates and the Islamic interbank rate are 
endogenous. The generalised VDC results show for example, that OPR and conventional 
fixed deposit rates are both in third place in the exogeneity ranking. This means that they are 
more exogenous and stronger leaders than the Islamic rates. As indicated in table 10, OPR 
explains 33% of the variance of the Islamic investment account variable, whereas the latter 
explains only 0.45% of the variance in OPR. Further, table 10 shows that conventional fixed 
deposit rates and OPR explain most of the variance (30-50%) in both Islamic investment 
Ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets 64% 
Ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits 54% 
OPR 49% 
Conventional fixed deposit rates 49% 
Islamic investment account rates 18% 
Islamic interbank rates 0.3% 
account rates and interbank rates. This is in line with previous studies, which found that 
conventional rates have statistically significant impacts on Islamic rates. 
 
To confirm the results of the VDCtest and visually present the transmission mechanism of the 
shocks, orthogonalised and generalised impulse responsetests were conducted. As mentioned, 
the generalisedtest results are preferred as they are more useful when normalised. As shown 
in figure 6, when OPR (dark brown) is shocked by one-period standard deviation, the variable 
that was most affected is the Islamic interbank rate (green) followed by the Islamic 
investment account rates (purple). They changed by 0.065 and 0.03 respectively over a four-
month period. The effects seem significant with no signs of fading. This suggests, as per the 
VDC results, that Islamic ratesare weak followers of conventional rates such as OPR. 
Figure 6 
Generalised Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LOPR 
 
 
LCFD = Conventional fixed deposit rates, LDEPTA = Ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets, 
LIINTERBR = Islamic interbank rates, LIINVR = Islamic investment account rates, LITOTDEP = Ratio of 
Islamic deposits to total deposits, LOPR = Overnight Policy Rates 
 
Figure 7 
Generalised Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LIINVR 
 
 
 
      
LCFD LDEPTA LIINTERBR LIINVR LITOTDEP LOPR 
      
LCFD LDEPTA LIINTERBR LIINVR LITOTDEP LOPR 
LCFD = Conventional fixed deposit rates, LDEPTA = Ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets, 
LIINTERBR = Islamic interbank rates, LIINVR = Islamic investment account rates, LITOTDEP = Ratio of 
Islamic deposits to total deposits, LOPR = Overnight Policy Rates 
Figure 7 confirms our earlier findings on the endogeneity of Islamic rates such as the 
investment account rates. It shows that a one-period standard deviation shock to investment 
account rates produces less than a 0.01 change on other variables such as conventional fixed 
deposit rates, the ratio of Islamic deposits to total Islamic assets and OPRover a two-month 
period. Results of shocks to other variables are not shared in this study because the focus 
variables are the Islamic investment account rates and OPR.Finally, an application of the 
persistence profileanalysis in Figure8 indicates that in the event of a system-wide shock, it 
willtake almost four months for the equilibrium to berestored. 
 
 
Figure 8 
Persistence Profile of the effect of a system-wide shock to CV(s)  
 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Forty years after the introduction of modern Islamic finance, this study provides the latest 
confirmation that Islamic rates such as investment account and interbank rates are still 
cointegrated with conventional rates in Malaysia. Additionally, in an exogeneity ranking, it 
was found thatthe ratios are the strongest leaders among the variables and the Islamic rates 
the weakest followers. Both the conventional rates (OPR and fixed deposit rates) are a tie in 
the middle. Worth noting is the change for the ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits, 
which is the proxy for the impact of market share on investment account rates. While in 
VECM, it was found to be endogenous, through VDC, it came out as the second highest 
exogenous variable. Since VECM is based on the historical sample and VDC projects into the 
future, this change is a likely indication that IFSA may help to reconfigure the variables that 
affect Islamic deposits and its market share. Other factors such as the banks’ asset returns or 
performance in its investments maystart to matter more than the variables in this study ie 
deposit and interbank rates.This may explain why the ratio is projected to become exogenous 
  
CV1 CV2 
in the future. A lot however depends on how the Islamic banks reclassify their deposits versus 
investment accounts and how these are booked in their balance sheets.  
 
Another factor that may cause the ratio to become exogenous in the future is the fact that 
Islamic banks can no longer use the profit equalisation reserves and investment risk reserves 
to smooth returns on investment accounts. This IFSA regulation may force Islamic banks to 
disburse the true profit and loss rates to customers, hence affecting the previously 
endogeneous nature of the ratio of Islamic deposits to total deposits.  
 
The VDC result, which stated that the Islamic rates are the weakest followers, is in line with 
the VECM results as well as previous studies. This study finds that OPR for example, 
explains 33% of the variance of the Islamic investment account variable, whereas the latter 
explains only 0.45% of the variance in OPR. Further, it is also found that conventional fixed 
deposit rates and OPR explain most of the variance (30-50%) in both Islamic investment 
account rates and interbank rates.  
 
The VDC results and exogeneity ranking are potentially useful for regulators such as BNM to 
compare the progress of its Islamic finance industry post-IFSA. If successful, the exogeneous 
variables should no longer be conventional rates but perhaps benchmarks with links to the 
real economy such as the gross domestic product, industrial production and equity market 
returns. If unsuccessful, BNM and Islamic banks in Malaysia may need to look for other 
ways for the banks to offer mudarabah investment account rates in a way which allows for 
true profit and loss sharing. This is inevitably linked to how they book the monies in the 
balance sheets. The need to balance the assets and liabilities may lead to a liquidity premium 
charge which shaves returns down to the level of conventional deposit rate. Thus, the 
regulator may need to set certainminimum requirements for Islamic banks, as per the IMF 
suggestions in its April 2015 paper. 
 
In ‘Supervisory, regulatory and capital adequacy implications of profit sharing investment 
accounts in Islamic Finance’ (Karim, Archer, Sundararajan, 2010), the authors highlighted 
that it is critical for Islamic banks and regulators to determine the true value of ‘alpha’, or the 
proportion of assets that is funded by profit-sharing investment accounts. It is critical because 
it will impact the denominators of banks’ capital adequacy ratios. Depending on the nature of 
the investment accounts, alpha may be close to zero if they are treated as pure, investment-
like products or close to one if they are deposit-like. Some themes in the study are outdated 
but the overall point of finding an appropriate way to book monies from the profit-sharing 
investment accountshold. This is especially given that banks still have a fiduciary duty to 
depositors. Thus, lessons from the implementation of IFSA can be bundled with this study’s 
findings and offered to other central banks which are also looking to either start, expand or 
evolutionise their Islamic banking practices towards a better version 2.  
 
Readers however, need to bear in mind some limitations of this study.The results are based 
on data from one country (Malaysia). For it to be relevant to other jurisdictions, regulators 
and Islamic banks of the receiving countries need to adapt the lessons to their local 
practices.The multivariate time series technique also has limitations. For example, the 
cointegrating tests (such as Johansen) and the unit root tests (such asADF and PP, which 
precede the cointegrating tests) lack power and are biased in favour of accepting the null 
hypothesis. The cointegration tests also require variables to be I(1) but the order of 
integration of a variable, whether I(1) or I(0), may depend on the number of lags included or 
whether the intercept and/or the trend are included or excluded in the unit root tests.Bearing 
these limitations in mind, research findings can serve as useful guides, though not conclusive 
evidences, to help policy and decision makers in their analysis.  
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